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A B S T R A C T
This article aims to rekindle the debate on the politics of aid in the increasingly
common – yet still under-studied – authoritarian and low-intensity conﬂict set-
tings, detailing the case of Ethiopia in , when a -year drought coincided
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with a wave of protests and a state of emergency. During four months of quali-
tative ﬁeldwork in , state, civil society, Ethiopian and international actors
were approached – from humanitarian headquarters to communities in the
Amhara, Oromiya and Somali regions. Research participants relayed stark dis-
crepancies between the humanitarian theatre’s ‘frontstage’, where disaster
responders showcase an exemplary response, and its ‘backstage’, where they
remove their frontstage masks and reﬂect on the information, the decision-
making monopoly of the state and the intrusion of conﬂict dynamics into the
humanitarian response. In humanitarian research and in policy, a collective
conversation is necessary on where to draw the line between respect for govern-
ments’ sovereignty and the intrusion of humanitarian principles.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Ethiopia used to be a textbook case of the intermingling of politics and
(international) humanitarianism. Drought response examples from the
s and s, involving forced displacements or the downfall of
regimes, abound. De Waal (: ) characterised the drought of
 as a ‘second-degree famine crime’, as the controlling Dergue mili-
tary regime ‘created and sustained the famine as part of its counter-
insurgency’. De Waal detailed how the Ethiopian army looted villages
and livestock, blocked roads and bombed markets, and requisitioned
World Food Programme supplies to feed the militia. In multiple
regions, international aid was instrumentalised to lure the population
into ‘protected’ villages (Hagmann & Korf ).
However, analyses of the politics of foreign aid ﬂows are thinner
regarding humanitarian issues concerning Ethiopian nationals, the
less peripheral regions of the country and more recent events. A few
exceptions are condemning human rights reports (Human Rights
Watch ) and academic literature focusing on the politics of devel-
opment issues (Bishop & Hilhorst ; Cochrane & Tamiru ),
refugee care (Corbet et al. ) or the more openly conﬂict-ridden
Somali region (Binet ; Hagmann & Korf ; Carruth ).
This article aims to rekindle the debate on the politics of humanitar-
ianism in contemporary Ethiopia. Relief in Ethiopia is mainly geared
towards disasters triggered by natural hazards. The country experienced
major ﬂooding in  and droughts in –,  and –
. In , . million people required international assistance
(UN OCHA ). Responding to disasters is the remit of national gov-
ernment, with international humanitarian agencies playing an auxiliary
role. Together, they face the resource shortages and logistical difﬁculties
associated with supporting millions of food-insecure people across
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various agro-ecological zones within an overstressed and competitive
global humanitarian landscape. Efforts to address these challenges
have involved improved disaster risk proﬁling, early warning systems,
drought-resistant farming practices and smoother aid procurement
chains and cross-sectoral collaboration. The technocratic language of
these interventions may give the impression that they are implemented
in ‘ahistorical, apolitical and tabula rasa environments’, as Cochrane &
Tamiru (: ) observed for Ethiopian development programmes.
In reality, power relations, questions of legitimacy and authority games
always play a role, although this is less obvious than in the previous
century. Today, the political is increasingly hidden in the mundane rou-
tines of everyday practice of relief programmes (Hilhorst : ) but
can nonetheless have major implications for disaster-affected
populations.
This is particularly true during accelerated political turmoil, as
occurred in  in Ethiopia, when the response to the worst drought
in half a century (de Waal : ) coincided with a violent protest
phase, the extrajudicial jailing of tens of thousands and the killing of
hundreds, followed by the declaration of a state of emergency (SoE)
in October (Abbink ; Amnesty International ). Focusing on
a year of both hydro-meteorological and socio-political stress provides
a much-needed reﬂection on the dynamics through which humanitarian
response and political conﬂict interact (King & Mutter ).
Moreover, although most conﬂict-related literature focuses on high-
intensity conﬂicts, it is important to explore the much more frequently
observed low-intensity conﬂicts (HIIK ; Human Security Report
Project ), such as the – turmoil in Ethiopia.
This political turmoil occurred in the larger context of a restricted
space for civil society, the implications of which are only starting to be
problematised in the development and human rights literature
(Hagmann & Reyntjens ). Possible repercussions for humanitarian
response in terms of how organisations frame and enact humanitarian
principles are still largely unknown. The study of the everyday politics
of aid in Ethiopia, with its strong if not authoritarian government, is par-
ticularly interesting in light of the current global resurgence of state sov-
ereignty afﬁrmations (Cooley ), which result in a widening gap with
the concurrently evolving understanding of international humanitarian
mandates (Kahn & Cunningham ).
Keeping these broader implications in mind, this article examines
how the relations between aid, state and societal actors affected the
response to the  drought in Ethiopia and which strategies actors
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developed to support disaster victims, given the context of protests and
the declaration of a SoE. Here, the concept of ‘actors’ extends beyond
the usual humanitarian suspects such as the United Nations (UN) or
international non-governmental organisation (INGO) members, to
include the realities and perceptions of government ofﬁcials and
Ethiopian non-governmental organisations (ENGOs). While our main
focus is on the providers of aid, the paper has also drawn on insights
of community members about these processes. A major ﬁnding of our
research was how role playing and discursive games inﬂuenced the
opening and closing of the humanitarian space where disaster response
took place. To analyse our ﬁndings, we draw on Erving Goffman’s
() distinction between ‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’ behaviour. We
begin by presenting the theoretical and methodological foundations
of our analysis and describing the Ethiopian context.
D I S A S T E R S I N T I M E S O F P O L I T I C A L T U R M O I L
As O’Keefe et al. () and many others (Blaikie et al. ; Füssel
; Cannon & Müller-Mahn ) have argued, disasters are not
external natural events; rather, they are societally endogenous political
processes. Who will be the most vulnerable to a natural hazard is socially
shaped, as is who beneﬁts from disaster response. Answers to these ques-
tions depend on who has the power to deﬁne and give meaning to the
disaster event, to decide on pre- and post-disaster policy and effects,
and to determine which resources will be allocated to which recovery
and reconstruction efforts (Olson ).
The concept of the humanitarian arena (Hilhorst & Jansen )
provides a lens through which to capture these dynamics, asserting
that aid is shaped by ‘aid–society relations’ in the sense that the actors
along multiple aid chains, from ‘donor representatives, headquarters,
state agents, local institutions, aid workers, [and] aid recipients … [to]
surrounding actors’, are intrinsically embedded in the society where
they operate (Hilhorst : ). As Hilhorst () further stressed,
aid actors do not form a separate layer, but rather add to the complexity
of governance, which is made up of government and a range of societal
actors. All these actors are subject to multi-level power relations, with aid
practices and their results remaining the outcome of ‘the messy inter-
action of social actors struggling, negotiating and at times guessing to
further their own interests’ (Bakewell : –).
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As major disruptive events, disasters are likely to serve as catalysts,
cracking open tensions looming close to the surface (Hutchison
). Drury & Olson () and Pelling & Dill (: ) highlighted
the porosity of the conﬂict–disaster nexus, asserting that ‘disaster shocks
open political space for the contestation or concentration of political
power and the underlying distributions of rights between citizens and
citizens and the state’. Disaster response then becomes one of the
venues through which political issues play out, diminishing or increasing
actors’ resources, legitimacy and, in effect, power. The apparent apolit-
ical dimensions of disasters can provide a useful façade behind which
to conceal the political manoeuvring processes of state, societal and
humanitarian actors around aid ﬂows. Still, a balanced view must be
reached. Aid and disaster response are partly (hidden) politics, with
the goal of furthering one’s interests (or those of the funder), but they
are not only a game of the ‘bigger forces’. Aid dynamics are complex,
as aid acts as a ‘conduit between places and people, facilitating relief
and reconstruction assistance as well as political legitimacy and, hence,
the political and economic stability of a place’ (Kleinfeld : ).
Disaster response in low-intensity conﬂicts
The ever-present politics of disaster becomes especially poignant in cases
of conﬂict. That includes low-intensity conﬂict (LIC) settings, which are
associated with relatively low numbers of casualties. LICs make up the
largest share of conﬂict events and are globally on the rise (HIIK
; Human Security Report Project ). Ethiopia, where cycles of
protests and state repression with linked sporadic outbursts of violence
existed prior to the  drought, can be considered a case of LIC.
Azar’s () conceptualisation of protracted social conﬂict helps to
grasp the source of these tensions: a disarticulation of state and
society, whereby the institutional state is dominated by a single group
or coalition perceived as unresponsive to the needs of other groups in
society. In Ethiopia, until the political reforms initiated by the ruling
party in , it was the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (later in coali-
tion with other parties under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Democratic Front) which dominated the federal state and accorded
‘ethno-cultural communities’ the right to ‘self-determination and self-
rule’ in the  ethno-federalist Constitution (Maru : ). In prac-
tice, the federal state became ‘stronger than any previous Ethiopian
state’, ‘developed structures of central control and top-down rule’ and
neglected ‘political liberties, respect for human rights and economic
T H E H U M A N I T A R I A N T H E A T R E
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X18000654
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 83.85.242.225, on 08 Mar 2019 at 08:24:47, subject to the Cambridge Core
equality’ – with identity and ethnic group tensions, democratic deﬁcit
and conﬂict as corollaries (Aalen ; Abbink : ). In LIC set-
tings marked by heightened (ethnic) polarisation, where ‘sometimes
unrecognized or poorly understood forces can suddenly and often unex-
pectedly come into play’ (Karl , cited in Kingsbury : ), dis-
asters are especially likely to disrupt daily life and affect institutional
change (Pelling & Dill ).
Although we would expect large-scale disaster events to lead to an
immediate outcry for international aid, governments involved in LIC set-
tings may have the opposite reaction, minimising the need for aid to
keep ‘foreign inﬂuences’ out (Kinross ). Indeed, as the legitimacy
of the state is already internally under threat (Ghani & Lockhart ),
humanitarian actors’ access may be fraught by contradictions between a
national government claiming sovereign control over the response and
the desire of international agencies to safeguard a neutral and inde-
pendent space for humanitarian action. Carving out an independent
humanitarian space is even more difﬁcult when the authoritarian state
doubles as a ‘developmental state’, which derives its legitimacy from
increasing capacities and achieving (economic) results (Mkandawire
). This applies to Ethiopia, where double-digit growth and infra-
structure mega projects are pursued to reinforce the performance legit-
imacy of the government, rather than ‘political’ considerations such as
democracy (Abbink : ). In disaster response terms, the develop-
mental state translates into (the depiction of) an effective state-led
system supporting all disaster victims, which makes it difﬁcult for
humanitarian actors to justify their ‘presence, access, and [independ-
ent] operational space’ beyond the channelling of funding (del Valle
& Healy : ).
This last statement hints at the importance of framing and role-
playing for actors to negotiate legitimacy and the power to decide and
act. In a context where state and society are disarticulated, inadequate
disaster response can quickly (further) delegitimise authorities as
responsible or capable in the eyes of the population or the international
community. Conversely, non-state actors such as political opposition
parties can increase their legitimacy and, in turn, political support by cri-
ticising the state or even offering better aid provision (Flanigan ).
Lacking the ‘naturalized authority’ and coercive power which states
can rely on to allocate resources or restrict other actors (Ferguson &
Gupta : ), international agencies rather depend on soft
power, ﬁnancial means and persuasion to deliver their services
(Beetham : ). The processes of persuasion, crediting and
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discrediting depend on successfully framing the disaster response as
efﬁcient and fair. A particular issue in LIC settings concerns the atten-
tion paid to minorities who may fall outside the scope of government
care.
Given the importance of making a good impression, the politicisation
of aid ﬂows is largely hidden from sight in LIC settings. Actors’ room for
manoeuvre is restricted not only by overt political actions, but also
through everyday politics – the ‘quiet, mundane, and subtle expressions
and acts that are rarely organized and direct’ (Hilhorst : ).
Spatial and bureaucratic restrictions are more likely to obstruct access
than the physical boundaries or violent actions that present barriers in
high-intensity conﬂict settings (Matelski ; Corbet et al. ). Aid
agencies often ﬁnd themselves seeking compromise with the authorities.
In a rare study of aid dynamics in authoritarian settings, in Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan, del Valle and Hearly (: ) reﬂect on the
‘ambivalent and symbiotic relationships’ between humanitarian agen-
cies and state power, characterised by ‘complexity that deﬁes easy
generalizations’.
The two spaces of the humanitarian theatre
Erving Goffman () introduced his dramaturgic perspective on
organisations to bring out the performative behaviour of people and
teams in interaction. This theory recalls the famous opening of
William Shakespeare’s ‘As you like it’: ‘All the world’s a stage, And all
the men and women merely players’. Goffman distinguishes the front-
stage from the backstage. Frontstage, the team seeks to impress the audi-
ence with a total performance, where the décor, props, lights and
spoken words all convey conﬁrmative facts supporting the chosen
image. Backstage, the actors remove the frontstage masks, following
their various goals but also gossiping and strategizing about their next
performance.
The frontstage/backstage perspective has obvious analytical short-
comings in the study of aid. Unlike the idea of actors staging a play
before an audience, impressions come about through interaction, and
the audiences play an active role and likewise strategise – attributing
images to the actors that are hard to reverse (Hilhorst et al. ).
Moreover, the boundary between front- and backstage is porous; in
the backstage, actors may likewise perform with the aim to change
social reality. Especially with the internet and social media, the backstage
is not only visible, but often turns into another performative platform.
T H E H U M A N I T A R I A N T H E A T R E
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X18000654
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 83.85.242.225, on 08 Mar 2019 at 08:24:47, subject to the Cambridge Core
Goffman noted that his use of these concepts was more rhetorical than
analytical, adding that the ‘claim that all the world’s a stage is sufﬁciently
commonplace for readers to be familiar with its limitations and tolerant
of its presentation, knowing that at any time they will be able to demon-
strate to themselves that it is not to be taken too seriously’ (Goffman
: ). The dramaturgic perspective is nonetheless useful to high-
light the discursive games and role-playing that are so central to the LIC
scenario.
Tying together the concepts introduced above, our analysis is orga-
nised around two stages of the humanitarian theatre:
() The frontstage, where actors showcase their disaster response and
dutifully play their roles of performing and coordinating aid with
informed professionalism, using powerful maps, impressive web-
sites and other props to conﬁrm this image; and
() The backstage, where actors share their perceptions of how disaster
response is actually shaped and carried out. Here, reﬂections on
observed challenges and power relations come more easily to the
fore. The same applies to actors’ hidden agendas – pushing for
change that aligns with actors’ interests or the interests of those
they represent, beyond strict humanitarian assistance.
While the front- and the backstage can be considered different worlds,
they also inﬂuence each other. Actors may choose to bring backstage
observations frontstage via advocacy, or otherwise use their insights to
navigate restrictions. Here, Hilhorst’s () concept of ‘ignorancy’
comes into play. Ignorancy recognises the naivety that aid actors some-
times display in the ﬁeld as an expression of agency – a deliberate feign-
ing of ignorance as a tactic to smoothen relations or appease certain
political audiences. In some cases, displaying a lack of knowledge of
the political is a pragmatic and conscious choice to gain the trust of
authorities and access to certain areas. In this article, we are particularly
interested in the questions of if and how actors strategise to act upon
their backstage observations. A closer look at the interface between
the front- and backstage spaces is thus integral to our analysis.
M E T H O D O L O G Y
The ﬁrst author conducted four months of qualitative ﬁeldwork
(February–July ), and the second and third authors carried out add-
itional research in July  and April  respectively. The case study
is part of the ‘When disasters meet conﬂict’ research programme. In
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Ethiopia, the data collection involved a total of  study participants,
 of whom participated in semi-structured interviews or focus group
discussions focusing on disaster response, especially how decision
making was shaped among different actors, as well as general and
-speciﬁc challenges and solutions.
Four periods of research outside of the capital provided in-depth
insights. Two episodes of two-week ﬁeldwork were conducted in areas
where drought and primarily anti-government motivated unrest coin-
cided in  in the Oromiya and Amhara regions. One trip was
made to the Somali region, accompanying donors visiting 
drought response sites, which allowed for direct observation of interac-
tions between all actors of the aid chain. Finally, a visit was made to a dis-
trict of the Amhara region impacted by the  drought but only
peripherally affected by the political unrest.
To preserve the participants’ conﬁdentiality and safety in  protest
hotspots, community-level focus group discussions were held only
during the latter two visits. Additional data were collected through obser-
vation and exchanges at community level, as well as during formal and
informal meetings of NGO and international organisation (IO) staff
members. Further, secondary sources including ofﬁcial humanitarian
reports, press clippings and the transcripts of four interviews relating
to humanitarian aid constraints conducted in  by Corbet et al.
() were analysed. All collected material was stored and analysed
using the NVivo software package.
Table I gives an overview of the semi-structured interview participants
by actor type. We included government ofﬁcials from the lowest govern-
ance level, called the kebele, to the federal level. In line with the epistemo-
logical paradigm of critical realism and the interpretive approach
(Summer & Tribe : ), we acknowledge that all statements
relate back to the participants’ subjective framing of the disaster and
of the LIC, the dynamics of which varied greatly by location, and their
own motives in ‘performing’ in the research. Far from seeking to
present the ‘truth’, hard facts and broad generalisations, we see
divergences and diverse interpretations as integral to our ﬁndings.
Discussing the sensitive topics of protests, the SoE and even some
effects of drought (e.g. cholera outbreaks) was not without risk for the
research participants. We addressed this by applying strict conﬁdential-
ity rules (Chakravarty ; Matelski ). The conﬁdentiality of indi-
viduals, institutions and localities was guaranteed, and local ofﬁcials’
authorisation to conduct ﬁeldwork in a particular location was always
obtained. As much as possible, we maintained strict ethics of
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transparency, although we did, for instance, de-emphasise our interest in
the political unrest in interviews with authorities.
In our interactions with community members and humanitarian
actors, indicating interest in and knowledge of the political in a
context where it is systematically backgrounded could increase trust
and openness. However, it was necessary not to go too far, and we
adapted our approach depending on the situation. Non-engaging ques-
tions on drought impacts, especially when beginning to discuss displace-
ment and deaths, helped to gauge whether the researchers and
participants were willing to move backstage or would continue to
provide the ‘correct’ frontstage answers to ostensibly apolitical questions
on disaster governance. The humanitarian theatre concept thus served
not only as an analytical device, but also as a methodological tool. The
interviewee’s and interviewer’s positions in the theatre also varied
across research settings. During the ﬁrst days of local ﬁeldwork, kebele
ofﬁcials liked to select the community participants themselves, with
interviews often conducted adjacent to government compounds. Only
after trust was established and the researchers were granted freedom
of movement and selection did the community participants volunteer
more critical reﬂections.
C O N T E X T
‘If it is a choice between making this public and not receiving aid, then
we can do without the aid’ (Sheperd , cited in Keller : ).
This statement, made by an Ethiopian empire ofﬁcial to a UN
TA B L E I
Overview of interviewees.
Actor category
In-depth interview and focus group
discussion participants
Community members 
Ethiopian government ofﬁcials from kebele, woreda,
zonal, regional and federal levels

ENGO staff 
INGO staff 
International organisation staff 
Donors/foreign government ofﬁcials 
Research institution members, Ethiopian or foreign 
Private sector members 
Total 
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representative during the  famine, encapsulates the politicisation of
disaster response in a country scarred by cycles of drought and civil
unrest spanning three governance regimes. Following the imperial gov-
ernment’s initial efforts to cover up the  famine, the military regime
(–) ‘seemed more interested in pursuing a political agenda of
statist control rather than a strategy designed to achieve food security’
(Keller : ). The military regime also instrumentalised humani-
tarian aid for its s resettlement programme. The rebels, managing
the drought response in areas they held in the northern part of the
country, were accused of misusing humanitarian aid for war purposes
(Gill ). Ultimately, the failure to quickly recognise and respond
to the  and  droughts contributed to the demise of both the
imperial and the military regimes. In the st century, instances of inter-
linked mobility and food security considerations (Hammond ) and
politically motivated food aid beneﬁciary selection (Cochrane &
Tamiru ) are still reported under the rule of a government coali-
tion headed by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF), which defeated the military regime in .
The EPRDF government came to power promising democratisation.
As it submitted itself to a democratic vote for the third time in , it
appeared the opposition had won more seats than the ruling party
expected. That same election night, the prime minister banned demon-
strations and public meetings in urban areas, and the post-election
demonstrations and violence left  civilians dead (Rakner et al.
; Aalen & Tronvoll ).
The  national elections marked a turning point in terms of dem-
ocratisation and space for civil society, with many important repercus-
sions for Ethiopian politics today. The  national election, in
which the EPRDF won all but two seats, was rated as ‘short of standards
of a free and fair election’ (European Union Election Observation
Missions ) and has been characterised as ‘re-establishing the one
party state’ (Tronvoll ). The government has been regularly criti-
cised for repressing human rights and persecuting journalists and polit-
ical opposition leaders (Human Rights Watch , ; Amnesty
International ). Government control extends to grassroots level,
with the local development armies network linked to the ruling party,
monitoring the population with a ratio of one party observer to ﬁve
residents. Aalen & Tronvoll (: ) concluded that ‘the excessive
clampdown on the political opposition and civil society, coupled
with the launch of new and repressive laws and the expansion of
local structures of control and coercion, all demonstrated that the
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outcome of the  elections was not more democracy, but more
authoritarianism’.
The restricted civil society space affected humanitarian actors’ work.
Agencies working on disaster response are no longer under the supervi-
sion of the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission, which
manages all response processes, but of the administrative Charities
and Societies Agency. A  declaration of this Agency and follow-up
amendments constrain the involvement of foreign-funded NGOs in
human rights advocacy and restricts NGOs’ administrative expenses to
a maximum of % of total budget, with vague interpretations of both
what human rights advocacy is and what constitutes an administrative
expense (International Centre for Non-Proﬁt Law ). Moreover,
reliance on international funding is restricted, leading many ENGOs
to struggle for their survival in ‘intensive care units’ (i.e. operating in
‘emergency mode’, geared towards their own survival) instead of chal-
lenging the status quo (ENGO, .. Int.). International
humanitarian institutions are not exempted from this situation. In line
with a longer tradition of high modernism (Hoben ) and the asso-
ciated concentration of power among the elites and bureaucracy, inter-
national humanitarian resources such as health support (Carruth )
and refugee care (Corbet et al. ) are increasingly funnelled through
governmental institutions and staff. Corbet et al. () detail how this is
closely related to practical restrictions (e.g. scarce business visas, suspi-
cious and hierarchical working culture with threats of expulsion, govern-
ment monitoring oriented around numbers and output), sub-quality
operations and conformism.
The increasing restrictions on aid have not impeded the steady growth
of the volume of aid directed towards Ethiopia. Fantini & Puddu ()
explain this with reference to the negotiation skills of ‘aid speak’-savvy
Ethiopian elites, as well as overarching economic and geopolitical
drivers. They point out how development donors ‘invoke[e] … the
emergence of exceptional conditions – typically droughts, famines or
displacement – to bypass conventional standards of democracy, account-
ability and transparency’ in Ethiopia (Fantini & Puddu : ).
Limiting space for civil society and political opposition reduces regime
criticism and dissent, but it can also lead to particularly violent repres-
sion when resistance does occur. The – drought overlapped
with the longest sustained and geographically most widespread protests
since the start of the current regime. The protests were triggered by the
intention of having an integrated urban master plan of Addis Ababa
encroaching on the surrounding Oromia Zone, but built on deep-
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seated dissatisfaction with the current political arrangement (Abbink
). Particularly large and brutally repressed riots occurred in
Oromiya at the end of , and in Oromiya (again most intensively)
and Amhara in summer .
This was followed by the declaration of a -month SoE in October
, restricting the rights to assembly and information. Tens of thou-
sands were jailed without formal legal proceedings, and hundreds
were killed by security forces (Abbink ; Human Rights Watch
; Amnesty International ). Figures  (BBC ) and  (UN
Ofﬁce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [UN OCHA]
) show geographically that areas of the political unrest and the
food insecurity that guided humanitarian action were thus largely
overlapping. This does not signify a causal relation, but it did further
test relations between aid, societal and government actors.
D I S A S T E R R E S P O N S E P E R F O R M A N C E S A N D E X P E R I E N C E S I N T H E
H U M A N I T A R I A N T H E A T R E
This section analyses how roles and power relations evolved in the gov-
ernance of the humanitarian response to the  drought, and how
this was affected by political events, according to different actors.
Frontstage
We start our analysis with the frontstage, where the spotlights shine
bright and humanitarian response comes across as especially well orga-
nised. The core tenet of the ‘Ethiopian humanitarian fairy-tale’ is
efﬁcient collaboration between diverse humanitarians and a proactively
and ﬁnancially highly engaged Ethiopian government (GoE), which
reportedly contributed at least US$ million to the –
drought response (GoE & UN OCHA ). Different actors recount
the story using similar words, as is shown by the following interview
quotes from highly placed members of the GoE and an IO, and a state-
ment made by an INGOmember during a regional multi-actor meeting:
So what was the magic behind having  million people impacted, but no
crisis? … [We have] a joint UN, government and INGO forum. All speak
the same language! You might not see that in other countries. (Federal gov-
ernment ofﬁcial , .. Int.)
How do we decide who gets to be on the decision-making bodies? All
country representatives of all humanitarian agencies are there; whoever is
not present is not present, but that does not really happen here. Because
T H E H U M A N I T A R I A N T H E A T R E
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X18000654
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 83.85.242.225, on 08 Mar 2019 at 08:24:47, subject to the Cambridge Core
of the nature of Ethiopia…Our approach, understanding of what coordin-
ation means, is to lead people to consensus … It is about providing the evi-
dence, having trust to ensure that people feel comfortable and conﬁdent.
(IO, .. Int.)
We are not hiding. We are not ﬁghting, competing, but work together to
have water for the community. (INGO, .. Int.)
According to these statements, the humanitarian model is not only
efﬁcient because of a high level of understanding between the actors,
but also thanks to its clockwork-like organisation. As can be expected
in a performance-oriented developmental state setting showcasing
high capacities, processes are technical and systematised, as evident in
interviews via the frequent naming of acronyms, institutionalised
meeting platforms (e.g. the Strategic Multi-Agency Coordination
Meeting and sector meetings co-chaired by a line ministry and associated
UN organ), performance targets reached (dispatched trucks and quin-
tals, number of beneﬁciaries listed in the bi-annual Humanitarian
Figure  Protests and violence in – Ethiopia, as compiled based
on internet and radio claims by the Armed Conﬂict Location & Event Data
Project (ACLED).
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Requirements Documents, e.g. GoE & UN OCHA ) and codiﬁed
processes. Concerning such processes, a key date on the humanitarian
calendar is the belg assessment; around  staff members from the
GoE, UN agencies, NGOs and donors are deployed throughout the
country each June to assess the previous rainy season’s (belg) perform-
ance. An intricate list of indicators (e.g. harvest expectations, market
prices) then leads to the classiﬁcation of districts, called woredas, accord-
ing to three prioritisation levels that are neatly pictured in different
tones of yellow to red on GoE/UN OCHA co-printed maps. Many
respondents described this assessment process as technical and inclusive
to all interested parties. The codiﬁcation of processes can also be found
at the local level. An ENGO staff member (, .. Int.) started his
interview with a detailed -step description of the disaster response
process, from the ‘analysis by local NGO, woreda and zonal government
staff’ to ‘the ofﬁcial launch when our NGO project gets the green light,
together with the donor and line ofﬁces’.
All these processes add up to an intricately institutionalised response
to food insecurity. The response follows a techno-logistic script; no nego-
tiations are needed beyond settling logistical glitches, such as ﬁring
corrupt kebele government ofﬁcials accused by higher-placed ofﬁcials of
causing gaps in the response (woreda government ofﬁcial , ..
Int.; woreda government ofﬁcial , .. Int.). Moreover, there
Figure  Areas affected by the – El Niño-induced droughts
(dashed areas).
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are few blind spots, as INGOs are presented as ‘hav[ing] eyes on the
ground everywhere, wherever they have presence they can provide
ground truth data’ (IO, .. Int.). Strikingly, the script largely
centres on IOs, the national government and funders. There is little
space for community initiatives or most ENGOs, with the exception of
ENGOs politically, administratively and ﬁnancially afﬁliated to ruling
parties. We approached one such ENGO in Amhara. It manages all gov-
ernmental aid storage facilities in the region, and continued doing so
throughout the protests (ENGO, .. Int.; ENGO, ..
Int.). ENGOs were never named as drought responders without prompt-
ing. Following prompting, ENGOs were described as important, embed-
ded and trusted by the communities, but their capacity was seen as too
low to be part of the efﬁcient system. An Oromiya zonal government
ofﬁcial (, .. Int.) described community members as not
doing anything without government command.
Although all participants referred to consensus-based decision
making, Ethiopian government ofﬁcials usually described a govern-
ment-centred system rather than a co-governed situation. A regional
ofﬁcial, for instance, described the role of UN OCHA as ‘the secretaries
at the forum … they take the minutes’ (, .. Int.). An INGO
member who had recently arrived in the country to manage emergency
response operations (, .. Int.) reﬂected on one of the ofﬁcial
meetings she attended at regional level:
On one hand, strong government is good; they should own it. But as an
INGO I feel we are being directed by government, and the UN as well.
An [Ethiopian government ofﬁcial] said in one of the meetings where I
was, ‘the UN is government’. So he does not see the difference. And in
his opinion the NGOs are there to be told where to go, what to do.
Although this hierarchy is recognised by most non-state actors as well, it
is not openly challenged. The central role of the government is consid-
ered legitimate, especially given the size and diversity of the country. A
strong and engaged government prevents replication and makes it pos-
sible to feed over  million drought-impacted people.
Protests and the state of emergency
The protests and SoE played nearly no frontstage role. Strikingly, the
protests were not mentioned in any of the weekly one-page
Humanitarian Bulletin updates released during the most intense
protest phase (June–September ). A ﬁrst mention of the protests
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was made on  October, when the Bulletin directly cited the Federal
Ofﬁce’s Attorney General in relation to the SoE (UN OCHA b):
the rule of emergency was declared to restore order, ensure safety of the
public and stability of the state. [According to the Attorney General,] ‘[t]
he nature of recent violent demonstrations and conﬂicts that led to the
loss of lives and destruction of properties make the State of Emergency
crucial’.
On October (UNOCHA a), the Bulletin made another mention
of this, stressing that humanitarian partners who continued to assist the
government sought clarity on their role:
the Humanitarian Country Team seeks formal clarity on how the humani-
tarian response can continue amid restrictions stipulated in the State of
Emergency on restriction of movement, designated ‘red zones’ and
restricted freedom of assembly.
The subject was subsequently dropped again. According to all non-state
participants, possible impacts of the protests and SoE were very rarely
discussed in ofﬁcial meetings where government ofﬁcials were present.
At most, speciﬁc incidents such as attacked warehouses and trucks
were mentioned, and these were not described as politically motivated
or more taxing than the usual logistical difﬁculties: ‘There were
reports of food not being dispatched quickly enough from warehouses.
Does it happen every year? Yes it does … It is a complicated operation’
(IO, .. Int.) As shown by the second Bulletin, the topic was
raised only insofar as the protests and SoE would interfere with the
techno-logistic script of the drought response.
Backstage
Moving behind the curtain, the contrast between the frontstage per-
formance and the backstage governance of the drought response and
the impacts of political turmoil, as described by the research partici-
pants, is striking.
Backstage, non-state participants emphasised government control
rather than inclusive collaboration. Here, the ‘government-led response,
with a quasi-Weberian iron cage of bureaucracy’ (IO, .. Int.)
was mentioned in more negative terms. Bureaucratic regulations com-
bined with a lack of clarity make the GoE the major decision maker con-
cerning, among other things, the timing and scale of the response
(a GoE appeal to the international community is necessary) and the
selection of activities, areas (permits must be granted) and beneﬁciaries.
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Backstage, the effective capacity of the government, usually praised
frontstage, was sometimes put in a different perspective. Community
members in all visited areas, including the less LIC-affected Amhara
woreda, mentioned widespread targeting ‘errors’ resulting in the exclu-
sion of people lacking basic means from the aid distribution, or in the
ﬂat distribution of food aid, regardless of family size. Because of the
seeming disorganisation of government ofﬁcials in charge of distribu-
tion, we witnessed villagers waiting for days in the town to collect their
(sometimes already spoiled) monthly aid supplies. An Amhara ENGO
member (, .. Int.) reported that disabled people, the elderly
and lactating mothers had to pay helpers to bring them the food from
the warehouse, as they could not go themselves.
Beyond mentioning these deviations from the ‘faultless’ techno-logis-
tic script, backstage stories explicitly focused on the politicisation of the
drought response. Rather than merely following the techno-logic, food
aid quotas are up- or down-sized at different governance levels for polit-
ical reasons, and corruption and people’s political afﬁliations reportedly
come into play in local ofﬁcials’ screening of beneﬁciaries. One highly
placed IO ofﬁcer noted that ‘our local staff is under a lot of government
pressure’, ultimately reaching the conclusion that ‘targeting is an illu-
sion invented by [the agency] and the government to please the
donors’ (IO, .. Int.).
These accounts contradict the technical, efﬁcient and needs-based
frontstage depictions of screening and distribution. Representatives of
NGOs, community members and some IOs further lamented the lack
of independence, on-the-ground monitoring and complaint mechan-
isms – in short, a disconnect between disaster response actors and the
communities they want to help. The following quotes further highlight
the limited independence of disaster response actors, which was also
noticed by GoE ofﬁcials and community members:
Ideally, the NGOs should bring up ground experiences to high levels …
Here, NGOs can at most become contractors to do the work the govern-
ment wants them to do. They are not really seen as partners or innovators;
their potential is not used. (donor , .. Int.)
If INGOs had the chance to get direct contact with the community – that
is my wish. Now the government is the one communicating and deciding. So
there is a big chance in using that for other purposes. (Oromiya woreda gov-
ernment ofﬁcial , .. Int.)
Donors should participate in the activities we prefer. The contact to us
should be direct. Without any interference. Now it is not direct contact.
(Oromiya community member , .. Int.)
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Linked to this issue of limited independence, the main challenge iden-
tiﬁed by respondents in the backstage area was not logistics but informa-
tion – the lack of it, its distortion and its political use. An INGO
member’s (, .. Int.) summary exempliﬁed the statements
of many: ‘Here, you can’t give numbers without the government bless-
ing. Information sharing is such a sensitive issue in Ethiopia. What you
state should always be linked to a government source.’
Citing government sources is a difﬁcult feat when numbers are hard to
come by or to be trusted. For the – drought, ‘it took a long
time for the government to really become transparent about [the]
volume, size, and extent of the problem’ (donor , .. Int.).
The historical taboos surrounding drought-induced death, displace-
ment and outbreaks of diseases such as cholera also make obtaining
information or programme authorisations difﬁcult. Some agencies
have to work for a drought impact to be recognised before starting to
take action on it, or grapple with alternative terms, such as ‘acute
watery diarrhoea’ for cholera. The associated challenges are numerous,
impacting, among other things, fundraising, planning, and importing
drugs that require special authorisation. The controversy around infor-
mation was apparent in many interviews, where the frontstage and back-
stage of the drought response fused into frequently contradictory
statements, such as in an interview with an Oromiya-based INGO
ofﬁcial (, .. Int.). Early on in the interview, in response to a
question of whether his INGO conducted its own assessments, he
replied, ‘We do not do our own. We support them, the government. It
is better for us if we participate with them. The information from
them is real.’ He then contradicted himself  minutes later, when
asked to elaborate on the ideal shape of disaster response: ‘It would
be better if [INGOs] did assessments. We receive reports only.
Reading and seeing is a different thing. Also we should participate in
monitoring. As it is now, we have too limited access.’
Protests and the state of emergency
The protests and SoE impacted the drought response much more than
the frontstage performance suggests. A number of incidents occurred,
such as attacks on aid transports, warehouses and government facilities,
as well as government ofﬁcials raiding NGO cars and preventing access.
In Oromiya, where unrest would ‘happen every day in a new place,
without possibilities to predict’, the situation was ‘very challenging’
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(IO, .. Int.), to the extent that some INGOs called their ﬁeld
staff back to Addis for a few days. One IO member also reported (IO,
.. Int.) that his agency had started planning with regional GoE
authorities, keeping federal ofﬁcials in the dark, for ways of dispatching
aid other than via the government system (i.e. relying on more locally
accepted ENGOs or civil society) in case the civil servants were kicked
out and the people took control.
Our ﬁeld visits further conﬁrmed that the protests and SoE impacted
drought response. In a protest-ridden district of the Amhara region,
food distribution was suspended for one month (ENGO, ..
Int.). Stories of aid trucks set on ﬁre and aid storage robbery attempts
were reported in several woredas (ENGO, .. Int.). In the
visited Oromiya kebele, which was described as a conﬂict hotspot,
drought response activities of the government (e.g. health posts,
school feeding programmes) and NGOs (e.g. food aid distribution)
halted as violence increased from both the population and the govern-
ment. An INGOmember described the summermonths as ‘our hiberna-
tion’ (, .. Int.), imposed ﬁrst because of security and then
ofﬁcial access restrictions.
Many Oromiya respondents considered the SoE to have reduced vio-
lence and saved lives. However, although the SoE was considered to have
enabled the drought response by increasing safety, it was also seen as
having impeded the response, making access to certain areas, work
permits and information more difﬁcult. Information ﬂows were inter-
rupted by week-long internet outages and regular phone network
outages (IRIN ). According to one foreign embassy ofﬁcial
(donor , .. Int.) this happened because ‘there was some fear
of people with a political mandate coming in the wake of humanitarian
aid workers. That was basically seen as worse than having [a] big number
of people helping the population.’
The interviews brought out that the impact of the protests and SoE
were much more profound and political than mere logistical challenges.
INGO representatives felt that they were inadvertently placed in the
conﬂict. For example, when rioters burnt down a government grain
storage facility, a neighbouring storage facility, managed by an INGO,
was attacked and had grain stolen, although it was not burnt down.
The government then assigned soldiers to protect the still-standing
INGO warehouse. The INGO ofﬁcial telling this story (, ..
Int.) recalled, ‘We did not like that, because it would look like we
were siding with the government. But at same time, we cannot take
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the soldiers off, because there is unrest and we must keep a good
relationship.’
The direct involvement of NGOs was limited, and NGOs (without
much debate) avoided acting on behalf of victims of political violence,
mainly because these groups saw human rights issues as outside their
mandate. Only one interviewed staff member and one driver at the
same ENGO reported seeing it as their (personal) duty to assist
wounded conﬂict victims. NGOs nonetheless became part of the politics.
Some local participants expressed that the NGOs do ‘not need to come
if they do not help ﬁght the government’ (Oromiya community member
, .. Int.). Government ofﬁcials sometimes accused NGOs of
supporting protesters. The aforementioned driver was even hit by a
government representative while assisting a wounded woman.
The interviews also brought out how the drought response was instru-
mentalised to stop the protests. Areas and protesters were removed from
beneﬁciary lists, and people were rewarded for not protesting or for
informing on fellow community members, according to a woreda GoE
ofﬁcial (, .. Int.) reporting the words of a colleague: ‘If you
calm down, we will support you again, even if you did something
wrong about the government.’
There were also hints that the SoE affected civil society’s capacity to
deal with the drought. A community member with a higher position
in the indigenous Gada Oromo governance system reported additional
impacts on civil society (, .. Int.):
When the unrest happened, we organised more. To support each other,
amongst the tribe clans, the Gada system. Finding homes for the displaced,
re-distributing food … but the Gada, after the declaration of the state of
emergency, we had to stop, as we could not have meetings of more people.
Front- and backstage interfaces
The two sub-sections above have brought out the gaps between the front-
stage stories and backstage experiences and narratives, which are sum-
marised in Table II. In this section, we describe how non-state actors
dealt with the contradictions between the frontstage and the backstage.
The section only deals with non-state participants, because contradictions
were extremely rarely acknowledged by Ethiopian state ofﬁcials, along
with the regret that there was nothing they could do about it (beyond
‘hidden strike’ levels of going about daily tasks, asmentioned by zonal gov-
ernment ofﬁcial , .. Int.). One of the aspects Goffman associated
with the backstage is strategising to inﬂuence the frontstage performance.
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Limited room for manoeuvre
Many interviewees had no answer to the question of how they would deal
with their concerns articulated backstage. Interviewed community
members all expressed powerlessness in that regard. The few possibil-
ities aid actors mentioned consisted of dealing with the system without
openly discussing concerns or challenging the government: carefully
selecting the ethnicity of staff to be based in a ﬁeld ofﬁce or accompany
ﬁeld visits, maintaining parallel information databases and ﬁghting GoE
bureaucracy with evidence, numbers, detailed memoranda of under-
standing and donor guidelines, for various goals including being
better informed or avoiding operating via government structures in a
speciﬁc region. Agencies widely resorted to negotiating with the govern-
ment within the dominant technical discourse, stressing supposedly
objective facts and ﬁgures to adjust certain needs analyses and emphasis-
ing the common interest in helping communities. INGOs, for example,
stressed that they could advocate for certain issues and excluded popu-
lations as long as they remained technical about it. Using indirect and
unobtrusive tactics to inﬂuence the system required context-speciﬁc
knowledge, negotiation skills and trusted contacts ranging from
federal bureaucrats to kebele ofﬁcials. Only one participant reported an
example of a large donor that – behind the scenes – wrote a conﬁdential
protest letter to the government in relation to the blockage of aid during
the SoE (INGO, .. Int.).
Although silent diplomacy skills were important, independent action
was constrained by many factors. Of paramount importance was infor-
mation. Agencies usually had a limited presence on the ground and
TA B L E I I
Main frontstage/backstage discrepancies.
Topic Frontstage Backstage
Overarching gov-
ernance mode
Hierarchical co-governance among
diverse state and aid actors
Tight government control
Challenges to the
drought response
Few, except for understandable
logistical difﬁculties or corruption
of lower government ofﬁcials
Monopoly of the state on informa-
tion and decision making.
Politicisation of aid
Protests and SoE
impacts
Negligible Protests affecting the effectiveness
of drought response. SoE wor-
sening the situation in some areas
(e.g. weakening local drought
response mechanisms, aid as
punishment or reward)
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often lacked the whole picture. There were few venues to address issues
apart from raising them with the government, even where the govern-
ment was the source of concern. An Oromiya ENGO member (,
.. Int.) related how he had reported biased beneﬁciary screen-
ing to government line ofﬁces, although the bias came from government
ofﬁcials. To him, ‘that is the only route; we can’t jump’.
Three forms of self-censorship
Although a number of factors limited the room for manoeuvre and inde-
pendent humanitarian action, it became clear that agencies also played
a role in these limitations through self-censorship. Three forms of
self-censoring emerged as one of the only self-preservation strategies:
self-censoring of words, actions and knowledge.
Speaking out openly for an independent humanitarian space was pre-
sented as impossible and too dangerous, especially for ENGOs. Self-cen-
soring also took place as organisations framed problems as logistical
even when they were ‘obviously’ political (INGO, .): ‘We cannot
mention that the woreda government is not cooperative, but we can say
that roads are bad.’ Instead of openly raising an issue, actors would
mention  conﬂict issues via less locally vulnerable actors, as was
reported by an IO ofﬁcial (, .. int.):
We could not release a statement here; it would jeopardise the situation. We
had to send it to New York. If tried here, the anger and concern of the
federal government … they would have said, let’s shut down [the
agency]. We had no choice. … [A higher ofﬁcial] raised the issue with
the prime minister when he visited. So we have windows.
Self-censoring also happened in action and was often linked to actively
suppressing knowledge. When the ﬁrst author joined an NGO consor-
tium on a monitoring ﬁeld visit, they purposefully refrained from visiting
a water pump site in a conﬂict area, ‘because then the government
would know that we know’ (INGO, .. Int.). Ignorancy is also
seen in the re-framing of the humanitarian principles and mandates.
Human rights issues especially are excluded from the mandate,
despite the fact that they did hamper the effectiveness and impartiality
of the humanitarian response in . An INGO director (,
.. Int.) gave a surprising interpretation of the principle of neu-
trality, re-framed as ‘avoiding conﬂict areas’ in its programme. One
ENGO member (, .. Int.), when asked about drought-
related mortality, stated that ‘death is none of my business’. We do
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not interpret this as actual ignorance about humanitarian principles.
Rather, actors deliberately chose to narrow their scope and present
themselves as innocent and ignorant enactors of the techno-logistic dis-
aster response script, hence relying on ignorancy (Hilhorst ) as a
strategic device.
Humanitarian attitudes towards independence
A ﬁnal major ﬁnding from our interviews concerns the diverging atti-
tudes of humanitarian participants concerning what should be done
about the lack of independence of humanitarian aid. There was a
common backstage acknowledgement of this situation: ‘The under-
standing of the humanitarian principles is smaller here [in Ethiopia].
Humanitarians here work on ﬁlling government gaps’ (ENGO,
.. Int.). Our participants recounted three narratives about
whether this situation was problematic.
One group of participants, predominantly headquarter-based non-
Ethiopian staff of the large and longer established IOs and INGOs,
stayed closely within the remit of the frontstage narrative. As one IO rep-
resentative said, ‘Disaster response here is an enormous logistical chal-
lenge, but not necessarily one where adherence to humanitarian
principles is strictly necessary’ (IO, .. Int.). These humanitar-
ians were convinced that the GoE is basically doing a good job under
difﬁcult (landscape-dictated) circumstances, especially compared with
the huge famines of the past and with neighbouring countries. They
considered Ethiopia to be effectively operating and posing few chal-
lenges to humanitarians, viewed Ethiopia as an easy post, and were
not bothered by the government’s near-monopoly on information.
Another group of participants, working in both international and
Ethiopian structures, acknowledged that there were problematic
aspects to the drought response, but took a pragmatic view. They
chose to balance the need for immediate response to the drought
with the importance of good long-term relations with the government.
They aimed to maximise room for manoeuvre by ‘playing the game’,
as elaborated above. To them, keeping up the frontstage performance
was part of a considered strategy of ‘ignorancy’.
A third group of participants, usually members of ENGOs, of the
globally more advocacy-oriented INGOs, but also IO/INGO inter-
national staff members who only recently arrived in the country, was
very critical of the lack of humanitarian independence, especially in
view of the SoE:
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Overall, humanitarian space is limited. And we partly limit it ourselves. It is
usually the UN’s role to push for the humanitarian space; they have that
privilege. But in Ethiopia, it has developed to a situation that all think the
government is more powerful, that you can’t push, can’t discuss. I felt last
year, with the state of emergency and all, it would clearly have been the
moment to take a stronger position. (IO, .. Int.)
These participants accused larger INGOs, IOs and donors of giving
up on humanitarian principles and only being concerned with maintain-
ing good relations and ‘running their big machines’ in their oligarchic
‘country-club way of functioning’ (INGO, .. Int.). According
to these participants, geopolitical and ﬁnancial incentives, such as the
‘war on terror’, silenced the humanitarian community, and long-time
humanitarian leaders had slipped into a comfortable routine and lost
their critical edge.
C O N C L U S I O N S
Our analysis, detailing humanitarian performances and experiences in
the humanitarian theatre’s two spaces and interfaces in Ethiopia,
brought forward stark discrepancies between the frontstage, where
state and aid actors showcase the response, and the backstage, where
they reﬂect on challenges and strategies. On the frontstage, all actors
agreed on the (hierarchical) co-governance of the drought response,
largely ignoring the impacts of the political turmoil, whereas backstage,
they were often concerned with the information and decision-making
monopoly of the state, the politicisation of aid, and the consequences
of the unrest and SoE. In , the effectiveness and impartiality of
the response to a -year drought was especially hampered. Although
this cannot be generalised to Ethiopia overall and the GoE’s
(ﬁnancial) efforts and leadership were largely successful, respondents
of all backgrounds reported a lack of transparency and accountability,
as well as cases of biased response and aid being instrumentalised to
reward or punish drought victims.
Even more striking is how non-state actors behaved following their
own observations of the frontstage/backstage gap. For all actors, espe-
cially civil society members and ENGOs, room for manoeuvre is
extremely limited. The frontstage remains quiet, as disaster response
actors dismiss open discussion or advocacy, choosing instead to rely on
self-censorship and ignorancy. They follow a narrowly deﬁned
mandate and adhere to the techno-logistic script to keep helping
drought victims. But even backstage, silence abounds. With a few excep-
tions internal to some organisations, it seems there is no collective
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conversation on where to draw the line between respecting the sover-
eignty of the government and the intrusion of humanitarian principles
after conﬂict dynamics invade the humanitarian response.
Our analysis shows how the restricted space available to Ethiopian civil
society impacted the humanitarian space, where humanitarians ﬁnd the
discretion to decide what needs to be addressed. Although it is common
that the line between sovereignty and humanitarian space is hard to
deﬁne and negotiate in practice, it was found that such decisions were
rarely debated within or between agencies, and hence remained
outside the scope of reﬂection and evaluation.
Our plea to rekindle the discussion of the politics of aid in LIC settings
extends to scholarly work. It remains important to study what happens in
Ethiopia, where diverse and not least ethnic conﬂict dynamics unfold
and .million displaced people are in need of humanitarian assistance,
notwithstanding the  political reforms (International Displacement
Monitoring Centre ). More research on this will also be relevant for
the increasingly numerous authoritarian and LIC settings.
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Onderzoek (Netherlands Organization for Scientiﬁc Research), is led by Dorothea Hilhorst and
based at the International Institute for Social Studies, The Hague. For additional information, see
<http://www.iss.nl/research/when_disaster_meets_conﬂict>.
. Including four interviews conducted by Corbet et al. ().
. Cochrane & Tamiru (: ) similarly identiﬁed Ethiopian Public Safety Net Program
(PSNP) beneﬁciaries who preferred to stick to the correct/ofﬁcial answers in interviews because of
fear of retaliation and the absence of direct reward.
. This speciﬁcally refers to the selection of pro-government community members as PSNP
beneﬁciaries.
. This includes PSNP beneﬁciaries, who are the most vulnerable and do receive annual food aid
but are not ofﬁcially part of the ‘humanitarian aid beneﬁciaries’ statistics.
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